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Since 1997, a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (AIV), of the subtype H5N1, has emerged in poultry in Southeast Asia. Concern is rising, for several reasons. In May 2005, the virus was found in migratory waterfowl in western China [1] In the light of these conclusions, a glance backward to 1918 is in order. The number killed in that pandemic is estimated at 20 to 50 million. But the global population then was less than 2 billion, with only one quarter urban. And the relatively smaller number of people crossing oceans did so in ships. Today's threatened pandemic looms over a more crowded world of 6.5 billion, half urban, constantly and rapidly moving around. We know much more, but our circumstances are inherently more difficult.
In the UK, the government has announced plans to stockpile enough courses of Tamiflu to cover one quarter of the UK population by the end of 2006. In a world of good surveillance, efficient delivery of TAP, and no panic, this would be adequate provided H5N1 waits until the UK is ready. In the real world of panicking people, the UK plans could prove more problematic. Meanwhile, the USA is committing $25 million to boosting surveillance in Asia. An official at the National Immunization Program of the US Centers for Disease Control has juxtaposed this sum against the $800 million spent by the USA on anthrax vaccines, "against a pathogen that has killed only a handful of Americans and whose bioterrorist potential is unproven" [7] . We live in interesting times. 
